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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES CREDIT
UNION, a corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 16224

v.
AGAPITO ESPI!WZA and MARY
ESPINOZA,
Defendants/Appellant.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLA~T'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from Judgment of the Second
Judicial District Court for Weber
County, The Honorable Ronald O.
Hyde, presiding.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the'Second
District Court of Weber County, which held that Defendants
pledging of exempt property as loan security waived their
statutory exemption rights without evidence of their intention to do

o.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE ON APPEAL
This Court issued a Per Curiam opinion on October
10, 1979, summarily affirming the lower court without hearing oral argument.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Appellant seeks an opportunity for oral argument
and reversal of the decision of the District Court.
ARGUMENT
TEE GRANTING OF A SECURITY INTEREST IN
STATUTORILY EXEMPT PROPERTY IS A WAIVER
OF A RIGHT AND MUST BE KNOWINGLY AND
INTENTIONALLY MADE.
This Court stated in Clearfield State Bank v.
Contos, 562 P.2d 622

(Utah 1977) that a person could pledge

exempt property such as household furniture to secure a
note.

The Court mentioned this in dicta and disposed of the

proposition in a few sentences.

This is understandable

since the issue was not briefed or argued in full by counsel.
Appellant's brief in that case did not even mention the
exemption statute at all.

Respondent's brief in that case

raised two points on appeal:
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Point I:

Constitutional and statutory
rights of wife cannot be determined against her will;

Point II: Wife cannot be deprived of her
personal property without due
process of law.
This Court in Contos held that the Defendant (Mr.
Contos)

had no standing to raise defenses on behalf of a

third party.

562 P.2d at 625.

This holding disposed of

both of the points raised by Respondent Contos.

In his

brief Respondent discussed the exemption statute but raised
it only in relation to unprotected interests of the unrepresented
wife.

The Court's brief discussion of this point is certainly

dicta.

More importantly the issue raised in the present

case was not before the Court in Contos and did not need to
be resolved in that case.
The Court in Contos footnoted the dicta discussed
above to two Arkansas cases, Pope v. McBride, 207 Ark. 940,
784 S.ll.2d 259
F.Supp. 705

(1944) and Sieb's Hatcherfes v. Lindley, 111

(D. Ark. 1953).

the issue at hand.

Neither of these cases addresses

Pope is focused on tenancies by the

entirety and their effect on conveyances by only one of the
tenants.

There is no discussion of homestead or other

property exemptions or the standards needed to waive such
rights.
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Sieb's Hatcheries is also primarily concerned with
tenancies by the entirety in Arkansas and the possibility of
fraudulent conveyances therewith.

The case does discuss the

homestead exemption, analagous to the property exemption
involved in the instant case.

There, however, the court

held that "as to a homestead there can be no creditors and
thus there can be no fraudulent conveyance of such property.
111 F.Supp. at 715.

Nothing in that case either seems to

support the Court's discussion in Contos as it may apply to
the present case.
There is no dispute between the parties here that
a person may sell or alienate his property, including property
that is exempt by statute.

Likewise, there is no dispute

between the parties that a person may waive his or her
rights, including one's right to claim an exemption as to
certain property.

The dispute is as to the standard to be

applied before such a waiver or purported wai ~er is effecti~.
Appellant's Brief at P.4 cites numerous Utah cases in other
contexts holding that a waiver of any right must be knowingly
and intentionally made.

This standard has been reiterated

by this Court as recently as last year in Sandberg v. Klein,
576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) at 1294, and should be applied
here as well.
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Other state courts have applied such a standard to
the waiver of property exemptions by executing a mortgage.
See e.g. Aetna Finance Company v. Antoine, 343 So.2d 1195
(La. App.

1977) cited in Appellant's Brief at P. 5.

Some

courts have even held that the exemption right cannot be
waived at all by mortgage.

See e.g. Beneficial Consumer

Discount Co. v. Hamlin, 398 A.2d 193 (Pa. Super. 1979).
Appellant submits that the appropriate standard for analyzing
such a waiver is the "knowing and intelligent" standard
utilized by this Court in a variety of other contexts.

The

appropriateness of such a standard was not discussed or
resolved by Contos by any stretch of the imagination.
This Court has applied such a standard in relation
to Utah's statutory.homestead exemption.

This exemption,

U.C.A. §28-1-1, et seq., is similar in purpose to the
property exemptions of U.C.A. §78-23-1, et seq.

Both are

designed to provide a minimum amount of basic necessities of
life to prevent total destitution of debtors.

In discussing

the homestead exemption and possible waiver thereof this
Court stated:
The homestead right of a surviving spouse
may be waived.
Such a waiver, however,
must be established by clear and conclusive
evidence and it must be shown that the
party waiving actually intended to waive
his homestead rights as such.
In Re Dalton's
Estate, 109 Ut. 503, 167 P.2d 690 at 691 (1946)
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In Re Dalton's Estate has never been overruled or
modified.

Arguably that case applied the "knowing and

intentional" standard to personal property
well as to the homestead exemption.

exe~ptions

as

There the trial court

ruled that the Respondent did not waive his homestead or
exemot personal property rights.

This Court affirmed that

decision, which involved both real property and furniture.
There is, in Appellant's Exhibit l (the
agreement of May 8, 1944), no mention
made of Dalton's homestead rights.
There
~s nothing in the record which indicates
that Orin Dalton intended expressly to
waive his homestead rights, and such
specific intent cannot be implied from
the general language of the agreement.
167 P.2d at 692.
While the agreement there was between the executrix of an
estate and the decedent's husband and not a pledging of
property to secure a loan as herein, the principles set out
in Dalton's Estate are sound and should be applied to this
case.

Many other courts have supported these principles in

the context of waiving a homestead exemption.
Mealy v. Martin, 468 P.2d 965

See e.g.

(Alaska 1970); In Re Estate

of Funderburk, 521 P.2d 60 (Wash. App. 1974).

Commentary on

the Utah homestead exemption supports this analysis as well.
See Summary of Utah Real Property Law (1978) at 207.

-G-
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CONCLUSION
This Court should schedule oral argument and fully
consider Appellant's claims.

An analysis and decision

regarding the standard to be applied in establishing a
waiver of property exemption rights is necessary to resolve
implicit differences arising from prior cases decided by
this Court.

The appropriate standard should be the "knowing

and intentional" standard applied by this Court in the
closely related area of exempt homestead property.
7_,,

Respectfully submitted this
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day of October,

1979.
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